The assessment of exclusionary abuses by dominant firms is by no means an easy task. This is particularly true for pricing abuses, as there is no clear-cut way of distinguishing a price cut that is abusive from one that instead is pro-competitive. We argue that there are several shortcomings in the way the European Commission as assessed exclusionary pricing abuses in two important decisions concerning Internet access service markets: Deutsche Telekom AG and Wanadoo Interactive. First of all, in computing downstream costs to apply the price squeeze test the incumbent's economies of scale and unavoidable costs should be factored in, as the test is only meant to establish whether an as-efficient competitor has been unlawfully foreclosed. Secondly, since the price squeeze test provides only for a necessary condition for predation to occur, it is also necessary to prove that the recoupment of initial losses is a plausible scenario so that the conduct under examination may indeed turn out to be harmful to consumers. This is all but a trivial task, as there are some sources of endogeneity that may cause a radical change in the underlying market structure. Particularly, in markets at early stage of development, entry barriers that may facilitate the recoupment of initial losses ex-ante may cause a change such that market structure no longer supports recoupment ex-post.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadband technologies are general purpose shared networks. Sharing takes place at the individual level, with each individual using the network for multiple purposes, such as voice, email, online games, or streaming services. From a European Public Policy perspective, a widespread and secure broadband infrastructure across Europe is essential for the development and delivery of applications and services such as eHealth, eLearning, eGovernment and eBusiness. Furthermore, the diffusion of broadband Internet access is capable of fostering positive externalities that will contribute to the European growth and quality of life in the years ahead.
Yet the tremendous possibilities of broadband Internet are far from being fully exploited, as the average EU15 broadband penetration in 2005 is still at roughly 13% of all households, with France at 15% and Germany at 11%. 1 In this respect, one basic tenet of the European broadband strategy is that investment in broadband will mainly have to come from the private sector and that competition should drive investment, generate innovation and drive prices down. 2 As the fixed telephone network (PSTN) infrastructure has by far the wider coverage across Europe, telecom incumbents are leading actors in the broadband diffusion process. Competition in the Internet access market has been mostly developed at the retail level within the PSTN infrastructure. In this regard, mandatory local loop unbundling has set the stage for intra-platform competition, whereby rival ISPs access the essential input at a regulated price. Given this regulatory measure in place, it is no surprise that anticompetitive concerns in the broadband Internet access market have so far arisen in relation to telecom incumbents' pricing conducts in the provision of retail access services over the telephone fixed line. Price remains the only strategic variable competition can be moved on, if local loop unbundling provides competitors with a level playing field from a technical/functional point of view.
These circumstances make antitrust interventions of the sort we are going to deal with very delicate. A decision to convict telecom incumbents' low pricing behaviour may utterly inhibit their capability to compete, as mandatory unbundling enables rival ISPs to replicate their retail access service. Such a decision may turn out to be (in)appropriate depending on the (positive) negative welfare effect that the convicted unilateral business practice would have yielded absent conviction. 3 This effect is inherently difficult to assess and economics does not offer an agreed-upon general basis for such a daunting judgment to be straightforwardly reached. However, such a judgment is certainly worth making as the cost of a wrong decision (e.g. an erroneous conviction of a competitive practice -a so-called type I error) may turn out to be substantial, given the strategic role of broadband technologies for the entire economic system.
The way antitrust authorities instruct their decisions in light of the (expected) long run welfare effect of the unilateral practice concerned, and thus take implicitly into due count the risk of committing an error, emerges from the test they currently apply, the assumptions and technicalities that underpin that test and the significance attributed to each single piece of evidence collected. We outline the European Commission's approach commenting on two important decisions concerning Internet access service markets, namely Wanadoo Interactive 4 and Deutsche Telekom AG. 5 These decisions are both concerned with abuse of dominance by telecom incumbents, the first in the form of predatory pricing, the second in the form of margin squeeze.
We argue that there are some weaknesses in the way the European Commission has come to the conclusion that the conducts under examination were abusive. Section II describes exclusionary practices in the form of predatory pricing and margin squeeze. It also addresses the issue of what should be the appropriate "standard" to be chosen in order to test for the existence of such exclusionary practices. Section III critically discusses the approach followed by the European Commission in assessing competition in Internet access service markets as set forth in the above mentioned antitrust cases. This section also addresses the multiple technical choices that impact on the assessment of competition. Finally, Section IV draws some concluding remarks.
II. EXCLUSIONARY PRICING IN INTERNET ACCESS MARKETS
This section describes the main anticompetitive concerns that may arise or have already arisen in the Internet access service market and the approach set forth by the European Commission to deal with them.
For a pricing strategy to be deemed as exclusionary it is necessary that a vertically integrated firm (the telecom incumbent), with substantial market power in the provision of an essential upstream input (wholesale Internet access over the PSTN platform), 6 prices it, and/or its downstream service (Internet access service), so as to severely undermine the capability of an equal or more efficient downstream rival to remain in the market, thus preventing him from recovering reasonable profits for a sufficiently long period of time. This definition makes it clear that the key element is the downstream margin and its impact on downstream entry and exit, rather than the price level of the upstream input per se.
A. Predatory Pricing
A vertically integrated dominant player could leverage its market power to adversely manipulate a rival's downstream margin by increasing its upstream price, lowering its downstream price, or both. A relevant distinction hinges on the ability of the downstream operator to discretionally fix the price of the upstream input.
7 If the vertically integrated firm is cost regulated upstream (as it is the case for regulatory LLU), it would incur into losses if it decided to lower its downstream price below the joint costs of upstream and downstream operations plus a reasonable margin (thus, below the price level that would prevail under competitive conditions). 8 This would amount to a predatory pricing strategy. 9 Formally, predation occurs if
where p d is the downstream (retail) price; p u is the upstream (wholesale) price; c d is the downstream cost; c u is the upstream cost; and m the (absolute) "normal" margin.
The chart below ( Figure 1 ) provides a synopsis of an ISP's downstream and upstream costs, the latter being related to the provision of Internet access by means of LLU.
Upstream costs derive from the following services:
1. services used by incumbents and rival ISPs in equal proportions (e.g. loop rental and maintenance), 2. services used by incumbents and rival ISPs in different proportions, due to operational conditions and scale of output (co-location services: site space, energy, security), 3. services used exclusively by rival ISPs (on-site assistance to rival ISPs' personnel).
Downstream costs derive from elementary activities developed and used on their own by incumbents and rival ISPs to provide their respective final services (e.g. exclusive use of some network equipment and segments, or commercial activities). These costs include:
2. network costs to provide transmission capacity from the DSLAM up to the BAS (backhaul service), 3. routing costs to convey traffic from BASs to a central site which acts as a service platform for Internet access subscribers (interconnection to the Internet backbone), 4. international connectivity costs, due to the need to connect end users to the WWW, 5. retail costs, which refer to customer acquisition, support and billing activities.
Some downstream services can be either developed by rival ISPs or purchased from incumbents. The most important example is the use of backhaul facilities to link the co-location site to a rival ISP's network. Indeed, this service constitutes a bottleneck whenever the rival ISP's initial traffic volume makes establishing an alternative link inefficient. The subdivision between upstream and downstream costs changes with the specific wholesale solution concerned: LLU, shared access, bitstream and resale (Figure 2 ). However, in the case of predatory pricing this distinction is of poor relevance, as all wholesale prices are presumed to be cost-oriented and, consequently, the threshold price (below which retail prices are found to be predatory) will be the same whichever is the wholesale solution concerned.
B. Margin Squeeze
When a vertically integrated firm can price the upstream input to competitors discretionally, the exclusionary practice might take the form of margin squeezing. In a margin squeeze the incumbent charges its downstream competitors such a high upstream price to deny them to make a margin sufficient to operate viably. 10 Formally, let
p d be the downstream price, p u the price of the upstream input, c d the downstream cost and m a reasonable unit net margin.
11 A margin squeeze occurs if the real margin of the vertically integrated firm remains unchanged, as it would simply cross-subsidise its loss-making downstream operation from its profitable upstream division (raising-rival-costs strategy). However, there is a source of ambiguity in that downstream rivals are also upstream customers. A vertically integrated dominant firm might lose more by losing upstream customers than it could gain as a result of their withdrawal from the downstream market.
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Figure 2. Downstream costs with alternative wholesale solutions and predation.
10 While in the case of predation the vertical integrated dominant firm is necessarily dominant in the downstream market too, for margin squeeze to occur it may suffice upstream dominance. In this regard, see Crocioni and Veljanovsky (2003) and Motta and Streel (2003) . For an argument in favour of dominance both upstream and downstream, see Faull and Nikpay (1999) and Bellamy and Child (2001) . 11 Among the downstream costs an ISPs sustains in delivering Internet access to end users there are network costs (to deliver universal connectivity beyond the local loop), costs of customer acquisition, support and invoicing. 12 King and Maddock (2002) show that if the downstream market is not perfectly competitive (firms compete à la Cournot ), and the downstream product is homogeneous, then the vertically integrated firm, which has a monopoly over the upstream input, always has an incentive to increase the upstream input price, as its profit increases with it. However, the more differentiated the downstream product, the weaker is the incentive to price squeeze.
When the exclusionary pricing practice takes the form of a margin squeeze, it is essential to discriminate among different wholesale alternatives (LLU, shared access, bistream and resale) in order to correctly identify the incumbent upstream margins that would subsidize downstream losses. The chart that follows ( Figure 3 ) illustrates a case of margin squeeze where the wholesale solution concerned is resale of end-to-end Internet access (as it is the case in Wanadoo Interactive ).
Note that the incumbent's overall margin is larger than the downstream reasonable margin. While in a case of predatory pricing prevailing prices must be below the competitive benchmark (when upstream services are cost oriented), with margin squeeze prevailing prices must be at least equal or above the competitive benchmark. Therefore, with predatory pricing the incumbent's overall margin is necessary lower than the downstream reasonable margin, while with margin squeeze the former may even be larger that the latter.
13
This aspect has significant implications for European competition law. While in some cases it is possible to frame price squeeze as an excessive price abuse in the upstream market, or as a predatory price abuse in the downstream market, there might be circumstances where neither of the two mentioned exclusionary abuses are actually in place, but the price squeeze derives from a combination of the two.
14 Under such circumstances, if price 13 The incumbent might even apply both exclusionary practices at the same time, by setting retail prices below the competitive benchmark and charging upstream prices above costs. In this case, while the incumbent overall margin would not be affected, downstream operator margin would be even lower that in the case of pure predatory pricing (at equal prevailing prices). 14 For a treatment of margin squeeze as an excessive pricing abuse, see Motta and de Streel (2003) .
squeeze cannot be challenged as an independent abuse from excessive or predatory pricing, it would be possible for the dominant firm to foreclose equal or more efficient competitors without breaching Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Because predation involves losses, in order to test for predatory pricing there must be an assessment of whether the predator can reasonably recoup the short term losses once competitors have been forced out of business. Otherwise, it would be difficult to discriminate between anticompetitive and competitive pricing practices. As Baumol (2003, p. 25) notes, there is "no generally effective way" of determining whether a pricing decision is a legitimate business practice or an unlawful one, in particular, in a fast changing environment.
Industrial organization theory has demonstrated that predatory pricing, that is below-cost pricing that is profit-maximizing only because of its exclusionary effect, is a plausible scenario especially where reputation and financial effects are important. Predatory pricing (which entails short-run losses) would not be profitable, or make business sense, "but for" its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition by deterring and/or disciplining rivals. 16 We argue that the "but for" test should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for predation to occur. Otherwise, a penetration pricing strategy in an emerging market, which by its very nature is aimed at preempting rivals in order to gain an early leadership, would be caught as predation (assumed that a position of dominance in an emerging market does exist). Instead, a necessary and sufficient test should lead to challenge only those exclusionary practices by dominant firms that might foreclose rivals whose presence enhances consumer welfare.
17 Therefore, predation occurs in so far as it would ultimately leave consumers worse off.
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The fact that there cannot be predation without exploitation, 19 i.e. that for predation to occur there must be a case for recoupment of short run losses by 15 In Continental Can, the Court of Justice considered that art. 82 list of abuses was not exhaustive:
"the art. 82 is not only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure. (par.26)" (emphasis added means of consumer exploitation (excessive prices or output restriction), 20 once competitors have been successfully foreclosed presupposes the existence of a facilitating market structure, whereby the dominant firm enjoys a large market share and there are both entry and exit barriers. It follows that the more contestable the market, the less plausible is the recoupment scenario.
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As Vickers (2004, p. 23) puts it: "Competition to serve the needs of the general public of consumers -not some abstract notion of competition for its own sake -is the point of competition policy."
As regards margin squeeze, since this practice resembles a raising rivals' costs strategy in that it does not impose a loss to the dominant firm, the "but for" test is not significant at all. According to some school of thoughts, the same holds for the "consumer harm" test too, as a practice essentially consisting of excessive pricing upstream while leaving unaffected prevailing downstream prices could not be caught under the "consumer harm" test, unless we accept to broaden the meaning of consumer harm so as to embrace harm to the competitive "process."
22 Thus, anti-consumer effects are not a necessary condition for margin squeeze to be condemned. Margin squeeze could be condemned so long as we accept the principle that, where market power cannot be eliminated (as it is the case with upstream monopoly by telecom incumbents), dominant firms should act as if constrained by competition.
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This line of reasoning is in full compliance with the principles emerging from European case law, according to which the dominant firm has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition. Therefore, the dominant firm cannot eliminate a competitor or strengthen its position by recourse to means other than those based on competition on the merits.
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The trickiness inherent in discerning between anticompetitive and competitive pricing practices is even more acute if we consider the difficulty in concretely modelling and applying a legal test to assess alleged pricing abuses. The ideal would be to compare prevailing prices against marginal costs. However, as these figures are concretely unachievable, competition law enforcers can only try to proxy them somehow. Moreover, as it will be discussed more extensively in the following Section, antitrust enforcers' discretion extend also to other hotly debated modelling choices. All in all, a trade-off arises between the administrability of the test (which points to a per se rule, based on a simply enforceable standard) and the soundness of its economic principles (which advocates for a concept-based test, tailored to the specific case at hand).
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III. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRACTICE
In this section we critically discuss the European Commission's practice in Internet access markets as set forth in Wanadoo Interactive and Deutsche Telekom AG. We first point some sources of ambiguity in how Wanadoo Interactive and Deutsche Telekom AG have been framed with respect to the choice between predatory pricing and margin squeeze and the issue of recoupment. Then we discuss in detail the price squeeze test applied by the European Commission in the above mentioned cases and its approach to the issue of the market-expanding efficiency defence.
A. Framework Switching
Wanadoo's exclusionary abuse was formalized as a case for predatory pricing. However, there are significant elements suggesting that the margin squeeze model would have better fitted to the case. The European Commission implemented a "predation test" by assessing Wanadoo's net unit margins during the relevant period (January 2001 -October 2002 . This would be a consistent approach insofar as the upstream price were effectively costoriented, so that it would suffice to scrutinize Wanadoo's performances, as the upstream division of France Télécom selling the upstream input (wholesale Internet access) could not earn any profit from it. On the contrary, if the vertically integrated firm were to earn a profit from its upstream operations, then it would be more consistent and proper to label this practice as margin squeeze. The European Commission argued that "the cumulated profits earned by FT from its wholesale services, . . . can be contrasted with Wanadoo's cumulated losses from its ADSL services between 2000 and 2002 . . .", 26 and that notwithstanding that FT's wholesale tariffs were to be approved by the Minister for Telecommunications, the NRA didn't have a veto power over this approval so that FT had sufficient margin to set tariffs on its own initiative.
27 It follows from this that Wanadoo's abusive conduct would have been better caught under margin squeezing rather than under predatory pricing.
In Deutsche Telekom AG, the European Commission argued that DT's abuse consisted of a margin squeeze in retail access services to the local network (narrowband and broadband local access markets). DT had to set wholesale tariffs on a cost-oriented basis, which had to be authorized in advance by the NRA.
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In that decision the wholesale solution concerned was LLU, which had to be uniformly priced across the board. When implementing the "margin squeeze test", the European Commission assessed the net margins of the vertically integrated undertaking as "the difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services." 29 The passage that mostly reminds of the margin squeeze framework states that "to show that there is a margin squeeze . . . it has also to be shown that the undertaking subject to price regulation has the commercial discretion to avoid or end the margin squeeze on its own initiative." 30 However, DT's alleged discretion stemmed from its possibility to crosssubsidise the losses suffered in the retail access service market with positive margins earned from other downstream operations (e.g. local voice telephony service), rather than from its upstream profitable operations. The rationale underpinning this argument drew from the fact that DT's retail tariffs fell under a price cap comprising a price adjustment guideline for a basket of services.
31 Therefore, the European Commission argued that DT could have avoided the margin squeeze by restructuring entirely its retail tariff system on the basis of the specific costs of the individual services forming part of the basket.
32
It appears that this case could have been more properly framed as a predatory price abuse. As a matter of fact, DT's vertically integrated operations in the residential narrowband and broadband access service market were running at a loss. The European Commission implicitly took the view that DT recouped these losses from its contemporary profitable activities in related retail markets, that is in markets others than those where DT was implementing its exclusionary abuse.
28 Supra, note 5, at 17. 29 Id. at 107. 30 Id. at 105. 31 Over the period covered by this decision two distinct price-cap systems were introduced. In the first system (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , two baskets were established, one for residential customers and the other for business customers. Each basket contained access services (standard analogue and ISDN subscriptions) and the full range of telephone products offered by DT. The European Commission argued that during this period DT could have avoided the margin squeeze by decreasing local calls charges in order to offset an increase in access subscription tariffs. Since January 2002, a new system was introduced whereby access services had been grouped together, excluding voice telephony services. In such a setting, the European Commission posed that DT could have avoided the margin squeeze by increasing its ADSL tariffs, which were unregulated under both systems. 32 Id. at 165.
The effects of an abusive practice are likely to be the same whether the resulting losses are sustained by cash flow from other activities within the same company (which may belong to unrelated markets), or from some other sources, such as capital markets or financial reserves (deep pockets). However, absent a context in which the source of funding for downstream losses is a profitable upstream (dominant) market, it seems difficult to understand what a cross-subsidy analysis would add to the substantive inquiry on margin squeeze abuse.
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B. To Recoup or Not to Recoup? The Recoupment (Missed) Standard
As illustrated above, Wanadoo Interactive was framed as a predatory pricing abuse implemented by the FT's subsidiary, Wanadoo, in the residential DSL Internet access market. In Section II we explained that for predation to occur it should be demonstrated that recoupment is a probable scenario (the necessity of the "but for" test). Moreover, it should also be proved that recoupment would cause a consumer welfare loss (the necessity and sufficiency of the "consumer harm" test). Bolton et al. (2001) argued that the assessment of probable recoupment draws jointly from the plausibility of the predation scheme and the supporting post-predation market evidence (e.g. an ex-post change in market structure due to the exclusion of rivals and/or evidence of market power exploitation through output restriction/price raising). Where, however, the strategic predatory scheme is robust, the post-predation evidence standard should be less demanding, though of course still required.
Unfortunately, since Tetra Pak II, 34 the European Commission outspoken position is that it is not necessary to prove that the alleged predator as a chance of recouping its losses. This approach is in neat opposition with the standard of proof required before the US courts after Brooke Group.
35 It has been argued that since art. 82 applies only to the extent of dominance, while in US the law is engaged only if there is a causal link from conduct to market power, dominance implies ability to recoup (see, Vickers, 2004; Fletcher, 2005) . This argument is rebuttable for at least two reasons.
First, if inferences about dominance are made from a conduct allegedly abusive, there is a risk of circularity or vacuity such that false inferences can be made about competitive conducts.
36 A special case of misjudgement of this kind would arise if the SSNIP test has been applied in order to delineate market boundaries, so that its result would be aligned as a piece of evidence S. 209 (1993) . 36 As Coase (1972) warned, "If an economist finds something 2 a business practice of one sort or another 2 that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of un-understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on monopoly explanation, frequent."
for the existence of a dominant position in the relevant antitrust market thereof. The use of prevailing allegedly predatory prices as a benchmark for applying the SSNIP would imply a serious bias toward a too narrow market definition that, in turn, supports the existence of dominance (i.e. the opposite of the so-called "cellophane fallacy"). Therefore, to presume that the existence of dominance implies the ability to recoup might be a flawed judgement because of circularity. Second, the statement that dominance implies ability to recoup apparently dismisses the contestability theory and its insights about the competitive constraints that potential entrants may exert on the incumbent. The degree of contestability should not be omitted from the assessment, as it would provide useful hints about the existence of a facilitating market structure that may support a strategic scheme of predation. Therefore, antitrust enforcers should at least check for the existence of relevant sunk costs owing to, for example, fast technological changes (risk of technical obsolescence), large expenditures in advertising and branding, sources of information asymmetries or the possession of exclusive access to strategic distribution facilities.
In Wanadoo Interactive, the European Commission clearly stated that "the proof of recoupment of losses is not a precondition for a finding of abuse through predatory pricing."
37 Paradoxically, when arguing that predation may simply consist in dictating or inhibiting the competitive behaviour of an existing or potential rival (and not necessarily in a radical ousting of competitors from the market), the European Commission stated that "a predatory price is simply one which leads to a maximization of profits through its exclusionary or other anticompetitive effects."
38 But this statement implies that the predator must be able to recoup somehow the losses suffered! Moreover, having stated that for a public enterprise the need for ultimate recoupment of initial losses is less imperative then for a privately owned company, in particular if the public company can offset these losses with earnings from other lucrative activities and that, conversely, the purpose for a predation strategy could be envisaged in the effort to enlarge its customer base as a way to boost the financial valuation of its assets, the European Commission goes on describing some sources of entry barriers that would make the recoupment scenario plausible. All in all, it seems that the European Commission collected supporting pieces of evidence for the assessment of the probable recoupment, but that it preferred to stay to its unquestionable case law.
C. The Test Implemented by the European Commission
When dealing with exclusionary pricing abuses, competition law enforcers should seek to ensure and promote efficient entry conditions by preventing dominant firms from ousting rivals whose presence enhances consumer welfare.
The promotion of efficient entry conditions is not a plain argument, not least because there are several notions of efficiency.
39 From a static point of view, allocative efficiency necessarily implies productive efficiency. Therefore, in dealing with exclusionary practices, antitrust enforcers should promote entry conditions so as to prevent the foreclosure of rivals that are no less efficient than the dominant firm (the as-efficient competitor test). However, in markets characterized by very low degree of contestability there might be a trade-off between allocative and productive efficiency, in that if the dominant player monopolizes the market, entry by a less-efficient rival may improve social welfare because of the gain in allocative efficiency through lower prices (and larger outputs) that outweigh the loss in productive efficiency due to higher costs (Williamson, 1968) .
As regards price squeezing, this latter scenario may be relevant insofar as both downstream and upstream prices are raised above costs and margins are squeezed for less efficient rivals. Under such circumstances, entry by a less efficient rival would improve social welfare and, arguably, this should be factored in when applying the price squeeze test. On the contrary, in the case of predation, this trade-off cannot arise. Therefore, to promote entry from inefficient rivals would inevitably imply a price rise or quantity restriction and thus a decrease of both productive and allocative efficiency. It follows that in case of predation the price squeeze test should enforce viable entry conditions only for no less efficient competitors. As to dynamic efficiency, its relevance should be discussed within the analysis of the probability of recoupment, that is in addressing the consumer harm issue once having tested for the necessary condition (the "but for" test) for predation to occur.
In the "Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector," the European Commission outlined a framework to test for price squeeze. 40 A price squeeze exists if "the dominant company's own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the dominant company."
41 Alternatively, a price squeeze could also be 39 Textbook economics reports of at least three different notions of efficiency: i) allocative efficiency is reached when goods and services are allocated to the uses in which they have the highest value. ii) productive efficiency entails minimizing production costs subject to technological constraints. iii) dynamic efficiency requires that firms have the right incentives to invest and innovate so as to improve the quality and range of products, increase productivity and lower costs. This latter concept encompasses allocative and productive efficiency in an ongoing process. See, e.g. Motta (2004 demonstrated by assessing whether a "reasonably efficient service provider in the downstream market could not make a "normal" return." 42 The two versions of the test make use of the same set of information except for downstream costs: in the first one the downstream costs are those of the vertically integrated incumbent (equally efficient operator test); in the second the costs are those of an efficient downstream operator (reasonably efficient operator test). The choice between the two alternatives seems to be dictated by the concrete availability of data. Instead, the compliance with the as-efficient standard results from the specific discretional choices that enforcers must make regarding the configuration of downstream costs and the treatment of scale economies.
Downstream Costs
In both Deutsche Telekom AG and Wanadoo Interactive, the European Commission opted for the "equally efficient operator" test. However, a difference exists in the two cases, as in Deutsche Telekom AG the European Commission explicitly calculated DT's downstream costs, while in Wanadoo Interactive it assessed them implicitly by looking at Wanadoo's net margins, without making any distinction between downstream and upstream input costs. 43 The latter methodology is appropriate for testing the existence of predatory pricing practice, since to assess this allegation one needs to look at the net downstream margin. However, it requires upstream input prices to be cost oriented, otherwise, it would be preferable to use a margin squeeze framework and identify downstream costs. In Deutsche Telekom AG the wholesale solution concerned was LLU and the European Commission directly figured out the downstream costs specific to the provision of retail narrowband and broadband access services.
Regarding the kind of downstream cost figure to be used, there is a hiatus between the cost standard that competition law enforcers most often use and the cost test that sound economic principles regard as approximating more closely the theoretically correct marginal cost standard. The European Commission precedents have set two cost standards, one based on average variable cost (AVC) and the other on average total cost (ATC). Under Community case law, a price above ATC is conclusively lawful, while on the other extreme, a price below AVC is in itself sufficient to justify a finding of abuse. A price between AVC and ATC is deemed unlawful if and only if there is evidence of an intention to eliminate competitors. 44 Several economists regard these thresholds as being no longer appropriate. Baumol (1996) proposed to substitute AVC with average avoidable cost (AAC) as 42 Id. at 118. 43 Supra, notes 4 and 5 for Wanadoo and DT, respectively. 44 See also AKZO Chemie v. Commission, Case T-62/86, (1991) ECR I-3359, at par 71. The initial cost test was proposed by Areeda and Turner (1975) .
the lower bound. AAC is the average per unit cost that the predator would have avoided during the period of below cost pricing had it not produced the predatory increment of sales. Bolton et al (2001) integrated this proposal suggesting to substitute ATC with long run average incremental cost (LAIC) as the upper bound. LAIC is the per unit cost of producing the predatory increment of output whenever such costs were incurred.
In the case of a new product, the predatory increment of output is the total output produced. Therefore, downstream avoidable costs are those the vertically integrated dominant firm could avoid if it decided to close its downstream operation, while continuing to provide rival ISPs the upstream essential input. Incremental costs refer to the costs that a new entrant would face in order to efficiently operate in the Internet retail access service market. 45 However, as explained above, in the computation of downstream avoidable costs there could be pitfalls which might lead to an unfair price squeeze test. Among downstream costs there are network costs which refer to the need to provide end users with universal connectivity (beyond the local exchange point). In the case of a vertically integrated operator, these costs are mainly unavoidable costs, since they refer to the network infrastructure that the operator would anyway continue to manage and operate. Therefore, downstream avoidable costs would arise from any special equipment required to provide narrowband and broadband access services and from customer acquisition, retention and service costs (CARS). In performing the equally-efficientoperator test, to exclude these costs from downstream avoidable costs would be unfair, as an equally efficient operator has no choice but to sustain these costs in order to deliver universal connectivity to end users. It follows that under such circumstances the price squeeze test would risk to be underinclusive.
A solution may be to redefine avoidable downstream costs as those costs that a vertical operator could avoid if it decided to close its downstream operation, while continuing to provide rival ISPs the upstream essential input, plus those unavoidable costs that refers to self-provision of network elements which are not specific to the provision of local access to the fixed infrastructure.
In this respect, the European Commission took different approaches in Wanadoo Interactive and Deutsche Telekom AG. In the first case, it implemented the "adjusted" AVC standard, by allowing for the amortisation (over a four year period) of non-recurrent customer acquisition costs. 46 On the other hand, in the DT decision the European Commission approximated the AAC method, as it excluded network costs from downstream costs (these are labelled "product-specific costs").
47
45 See Crocioni and Veljanovsky (2003) . 46 Supra, note 4, at 107 -9. 47 Supra, note 5, at 155 -8.
Scale Economies
As explained above, when dealing with exclusionary pricing abuses, competition law enforcers should seek to ensure and promote efficient entry conditions. In light of this policy guideline, the issue of economies of scale and scope is a complex matter of debate.
Does the equally-efficient-operator price squeeze test, by focusing on the incumbent's efficient downstream costs, mean that scale and scope economies should be factored in? 48 This line of reasoning is consistent with Stigler's view according to which an economic entry barrier is defined as the cost that must be incurred by a new entrant and that incumbents do not or have not had to incur.
49 Therefore, economies of scale cannot be regarded as entry barriers insofar as new entrants have access to the same technology.
However, some authors argue that this definition of entry barriers fails to capture the dynamics of over time equilibrium adjustment, that is, the ability of potential entrants to thwart the incumbent from monopolizing the market and to undo any anticompetitive effect deriving from an alleged abuse (Carlton, 2004; Hovenkamp, 1999; Schmalensee, 2004) . In this respect, McAfee et al. (2004) proposed an antitrust definition of entry barriers, whereby "an antitrust barrier to entry is a cost that delays entry and thereby reduces social welfare relative to immediate but equally costly entry." Thus, while all Stiglerian barriers are antitrust barriers, the vice versa does not hold. Moreover, they argue that where frictions in customer mobility are present owing to switching costs, scale economies might well deter entry. Therefore, while scale economies are not entry barriers on their own, they are "ancillary barriers to entry" in that they delay entry by reinforcing the entry-deterrent effect of switching costs (e.g. brand loyalty), which is viewed as the "primary barrier to entry." 50 Consistently with this approach, economies of scale and scope should not be factored in when figuring out efficient downstream costs in the price squeeze test (provided that new entry is welfare enhancing).
In Wanadoo Interactive, the European Commission has apparently endorsed this approach in full. Among the downstream costs faced by Wanadoo, there were those for routing ADSL traffic provided by the parent company, FT. Until October 2002, routing charges were sharply metered according to traffic volume. This circumstance conferred Wanadoo a cost advantage so long as its competitors did not attain a certain dimensional threshold. In a suggestive passage the European Commission argued that "while the search for scale economies [..] may be included among the rational justifications for predatory behaviour, it may not serve to legitimise that practice from the point of view of competition law, since it has the effect of conferring a more favourable 48 For an advocacy of this approach, see Crocioni and Veljanovsky (2003) . 49 See Stigler (1968) . 50 For a treatment of switching costs, see Klemperer (1995) . cost structure on the dominant undertaking to the detriment of its competitors."
51 Even more suggestive in arguing that scale economies are ancillary barriers to entry which reinforce the entry-deterrent effect of brand loyalty is the fact that the European Commission treated directly the latter as a main strategic entry barrier, but not the former. As a matter of fact, two of the three strategic entry barriers identified by the Commission were the disincentives to mobility on the part of existing subscribers and the costs of acquiring a sufficient notoriety in a mass market.
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Note that by treating scale and scope economies as "ancillary" barriers to entry, antitrust enforcers are implicitly assuming that scale and scope economies would ultimately facilitate the alleged predator in exploiting its market power, once predation ceases. This modelling choice seems to apparently address the consumer-harm standard, as, by factoring out scale economies, the enforcement of the price squeeze test would ultimately forestall dominant firms to foreclose rivals whose presence enhances consumer welfare (by preventing the predator from passing to the exploitation phase). In other words, the treatment of scale and scope economies as "ancillary" entry barriers refers to the assessment of the ex-ante market structure as supporting the strategic scheme of predation because it facilitates recoupment.
However, the correctness of this presumption depends on a more subtle presumption: the ex-ante market structure remains unchanged after the fulfilment of predation. The argument ad absurdo goes as follows: the fulfilment of predation would arguably result in a changed ex-post market structure (as this is the main strategic pursuit of the predator); it may be the case that the resulting ex-post market structure will no longer support the ex-ante strategic scheme for predation, owing to a lessening of the same strategic "primary" entry barriers that ex-ante would have facilitated recoupment (e.g. switching costs -brand loyalty); thus, the very same fulfilment of predation would cause an averse change that eventually makes recoupment less probable (the ex-post degree of contestability is therefore endogenously determined by the dominant firm's pre-emption); indeed, what ex-ante apparently is predatory may turn out to be lawful ex-post.
If this argument ad absurdo reasonably conforms to the actual market structure concerned, scale (and scope) economies should at least be factored in, so as to properly assess static (allocative and productive) efficiency, which is the distinctive subject matter of the equally-efficient price squeeze test. At least but not at best. If the scenario described above is plausible, a rigorous assessment of probable recoupment should not be omitted. If, given the fulfilment of the alleged predatory scheme, the resulting ex-post market structure is less facilitating than the ex-ante market structure, how would this eventually deteriorate the probability of recoupment?
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In Wanadoo Interactive the European Commission outlined Wanadoo's strategic scheme of predation in terms of a pre-emption strategy combining below cost pricing and substantial sales volumes aimed at maximizing revenue and margins on ADSL subscription in the long run. 54 The European Commission described in detail a number of obstacles to entry and growth of competitors that would facilitate recoupment, namely: the disincentives to mobility on the part of existing customers; the need to build up a brand image to acquire a critical mass size; 55 and the cost of alternatives to the wholesale offering proposed to ISPs by FT.
The first two entry barriers are strongly interrelated. The first refers to the presence of switching costs due, for example, to brand loyalty and customer satisfaction. The European Commission argued that "owing to the disincentives to mobility on the part of existing subscribers, the bulk of the effort involved in the conquest of market shares by competitors must therefore be concentrated on new customers." 56 However, it advanced that "not only is the advertising and promotion expenditure competitors must incur if they are to acquire a certain visibility substantial, but it is less effective than that of Wanadoo owing to the advantages in terms of notoriety on the relevant market already enjoyed by that company." 57 Therefore, "the foreseeable difficulty for competitors to acquire a critical size on a mass market enabled Wanadoo to envisage as perfectly plausible a market sufficiently concentrated to allow a recoupment of losses." 58 The relationship between scale economies, switching cost and the cost of achieving a critical mass can be fully appreciated in the following passage: "in order to benefit from scale economies in the activity in question, [. . .] it is necessary to acquire several tens of thousands of customers, which in itself calls for a very substantial advertising and promotion outlay on top of the other customer acquisition costs." 59 53 Beggs and Klemperer (1992) developed an infinite horizon model with continuing arrival of new consumers and attrition of old ones. Therein, price wars initially occur when both firms have few captive customers, but when the population is stationary (as in an established market) the competitive process converges monotonically over time to a stationary configuration of prices and market shares. In particular, an incumbent's monopoly can be challanged by an entrant who eventually achieves a large share. This model casts doubts on interpreting switching costs as barriers to entry in stable markets: switching costs induce an incumbent to price high in order to exploit its captive market, enabling an entrant to capture new arrivals at lower but still profitable prices. 54 Supra, note 4, at 292-99. 55 Inasmuch as customers acquisition costs are specific to identifying the trademark concerned (when different from the corporate brand), they are irreversible and, thus, sunk. This line of reasoning portrays a facilitating market structure which consistently ascribes plausibility to the predatory strategic scheme of market pre-emption. However, the picture described is based on the ex-ante market structure: the European Commission's argument actually projects ex-post the conditions prevailing ex-ante as unaffected by the fulfilment of the preemption strategic design. Instead, to correctly figure out the foreseeable recoupment scenario it is necessary to account for two relevant conjectures: i) the struggle of competitors to enter the market takes place during the exploitation phase, rather then during the pre-emption phase; ii) the absolute dimension of the market will be larger than the ex-ante market dimension (from an early phase of market development to a stabilized phase of development/maturity).
The first guesswork arguably entails that existing customer satisfaction would be harmed and, consequently, their brand loyalty would be at least partially eased, because of Wanadoo's exploitation through price-raising/outputrestriction. The second assumption suggests that the costs of entering and acquiring a critical mass market be changed in nature, efficiency and efficacy.
This cost is due to advertising and promotion expenditures. To the extent that advertising provides information, a firm that advertises is selling a joint product: the sheer product plus information. A firm's advertising is a shift parameter that moves the demand curve for the firm's product. When a new product is launched, advertising main goal is to convince potential adopters to buy/discover the unknown product. Under such circumstances, each brand-new product can be conceptualised as an "experience good." 60 Broadband Internet access can be conceptualized as an experience good both for residential potential customers who have not yet experienced it, and for low-speed existing customers. 61 On the contrary, existing (experienced) broadband customers can easily define their usage profile and satisfaction in terms of technical performances described objectively. Thus, existing broadband customers can easily compare competing alternatives on the basis of their performance profile: once it has been experienced, residential broadband Internet access can be properly thought of as a search good (i.e. products or services with features and characteristics easily observable before purchase).
In the pre-emption phase, when a new product has to be launched and a new market developed, the dominant firm's promotional and advertising 60 An experience good is a product or service whose characteristics such as quality or price are difficult to observe. These characteristics can only be ascertained upon consumption (Nelson, 1970) . However, not every new product is an experience good. Some of them may be thought of as post-experience goods, that is goods for which it is difficult for consumers to ascertain the quality even after they have consumed them. 61 The distinction between broadband and narrowband Internet access is based on differences in use and technical performances, so that the two products allow very different usage profiles (and, ultimately, experiences). campaigns are aimed at shifting the overall demand curve for an "experience" product. When the pre-emption/predation phase comes to an end (i.e. the population of end-users is stationary), and the dominant firm starts exploiting its market power, new entrants' advertising and promotional campaigns are aimed at shifting their respective (residual) demand curves. As a consequence, they will mostly address incumbent's existing customers, who by this time have fully appreciated broadband features and, thus, found it easy to acquire information in advance of consumption. Therefore, the very nature of marketing effort changes, relatively to that of the dominant firm: even though the target is the same, the perception of product evolves (upgrades) over time. The evolution in perception affects the efficiency and efficacy of new entrants' advertising and promotional campaigns. In the case of an experience good, to lure away incumbent's existing customers is more difficult than in case of a search good. Consumers cannot easily compare competing products and so they rely on reputation and create inertia. Moreover, experience goods typically have lower price elasticity than search goods, as consumers fear that lower prices may be due to unobservable problems or quality issues. Under such circumstances, first mover advantage would be of strategic importance and brand loyalty would be a strong entry barrier. Thus, recoupment would be probable. Instead, in case of search goods, consumers can easily verify the quality/price ratio of the competing product and make sure that the products are comparable. Therefore, search goods are more subject to price competition. Moreover, given the exploitation pursuit of the incumbent, existing customers may themselves actively search for comparable alternatives at a lower prices.
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Under such circumstances the incumbent would rather accommodate entry than re-deterring aggressively. This is an instance of a general effect that Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) define as "fat cat": a "fat cat" incumbent with a large stock of 'goodwill' with customers (due to switching costs or perhaps advertising) prefers to exploit its existing stock rather than countering entrants.
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All this suggests rivals' marketing effort to be more efficient and effective than in the case where market structure is ex-post unaffected by the fulfilment of the pre-emption strategy. Therefore, to overlook the endogenity in ex-post degree of contestability when assessing the plausibility and probability of recoupment might be misleading.
Retail Prices
The definition of the incumbent's downstream price (p d in equations 1 and 2) raises several issues relating to the implementation of the price squeeze test.
Above all, upstream and downstream prices should be comparable. In the case of a single downstream product the comparison is straightforward, provided that the non-linearity of the two prices is treated uniformly.
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When the downstream products are more than one, it is essential to look at the economic relationships between them. If these retail products are mutually exclusive (not necessarily substitute), a separate price squeeze test should be performed for each of them (arguably starting with the cheapest retail service, given that this service is the most likely to create a price squeeze).
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On the other hand, when downstream products are complements, it must be assessed whether each product should be subject to a separate test or whether a combined price squeeze test should be applied.
In the context of Internet access over the PSTN, the LLU enables the delivery of mutually exclusive retail solutions (analogue, ISDN and DSLs) which can even refer to distinct relevant antitrust markets. As to complementarity, especially for broadband solutions, basic Internet access revenues (connection and subscription fees) might underestimate overall revenues from Internet access customers, insofar as there are complementary services (e.g. e-commerce and content-related services) that are inseparable from Internet basic access. 66 Under such circumstances, the revenues resulting from these services should be incorporated into the analysis.
The European Commission applied opposite standards in Wanadoo Interactive and Deutsche Telekom AG. In the first case, it conducted a separate predation test for each of the two ADSL retail alternatives which Wanadoo was selling at the time under scrutiny. Regarding complementary services, it incorporated in the overall revenue figure the revenues resulting from online advertising, e-commerce and audience fees, although these products related to activities distinct from Internet access. 67 Conversely, in Deutsche Telekom AG the European Commission opted for a basket of three mutually exclusive access solutions actually marketed by DT (analogue, ISDN and ADSL access products), weighted for their quantitative quotas. Moreover, it rejected a defendant claim to include additional sources of revenue (resulting from telephone calls), arguing that "the primary consideration here is the effect on market entry by competitors, and not the question 64 Usually, both wholesale and retail access prices to the local network take the form of a two-part tariff. 65 By way of contrast, in an ex ante regulatory environment, NRAs cannot identify individual retail services with great specificity. Under such circumstances, it is admissible to refer to a basket of retail services where each service is weighted according to a given driver (e.g. sales volumes). See European Commission (2001). 66 These complementary products may even be bundled together and sold at a bundled price that could be lower than the combined price of the two products sold separately, and possibly the wholesale price of the essential input. 67 Supra, note 4, at 35.
whether the end-user regards access services and calls as a single bundle of products."
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D. Market Expanding Efficiency Defence
In Wanadoo Interactive the European Commission dismissed the defendant's claim that below-cost pricing was justified as a means to achieve economies of scale. The European Commission argued that scale economies were conferring a competitive cost advantage to the dominant firm that would have deterred competitors from entering and expanding into the markets, in particular those where the dominant firm was enjoying brand loyalty.
When a relevant market is experiencing a period of sustained expansion, there may be other legitimate justifications for below-cost pricing.
69 These justifications, which all attain to foreseeable dynamic efficiency gains to compensate for current losses, may be analysed within the framework developed by Bolton et al. (2001) , namely that an aggressive price by the defendant is justified if the following criteria are concurrently met: i) plausible efficiency gains; ii) no less restrictive alternative; iii) efficiency-enhancing recoupment (rather than recoupment from increased profit through eliminating or disciplining rivals). The defendant would have the burden of proving the first and the third element, while competition law enforcers would have to identify one or more plausible less restrictive alternatives, before shifting the burden back to the defendant which will then have to show that such alternatives are either unfeasible or no less restrictive.
In Wanadoo Interactive, the defendant argued that a plausible efficiency gain, justifying its below-cost pricing, would have been the positive externalities deriving from broadband diffusion, as the ensuing widespread awareness of broadband advantages among end-users would have ended up benefiting its competitors and the market for specific high-speed content. 70 The rationale for this efficiency defence relates to the "chicken and egg" coordination failure. From a demand side perspective, the adoption process may undergo the "chicken and egg" problem in that the network good may fail to take off even if all consumers have a strong preference for it, because strong network effects command a poor pay-off in case of under-adoption, thus implying a strong disincentive to adopt at the initial stage of development. Under such circumstances, the tendency to coordinate on a wrong equilibrium (i.e. underadoption or no adoption at all) may only be corrected through expectations, 68 Supra, note 5, at 127. Note that Ofcom dismissed a complaint by BT claiming that it could offer a retail subscription at a price below its wholesale price because it expected additional revenues from e-commerce and advertising. See Ofcom (2001a). 69 The market expanding efficiency defence cannot be a valid defending argument in the case of margin squeeze, since the alleged predator does not sacrifice any current profit for future efficiency gains. 70 Supra, note 4, at 310. that is by dynamically delivering positive feedbacks to help achieving the critical mass.
The European Commission maintained, first, that there was no proof corroborating this line of reasoning, secondly that there was a less restrictive alternative whereby the FT group could have fostered a more balanced growth path of the ADSL market by pricing all its wholesale products at low levels and encouraging the entry of competitors.
71 With respect to this second point, the European Commission counterargument was consistent with the description of positive network effects proposed by Wanadoo. According to Wanadoo, the overall network size (overall broadband customer base) is to be conceptualized as a public good, in that the IP/TCP standard provides competing local networks (operated by rival ISPs) with a common platform which assures compatibility across the Internet. 72 Therefore, under compatibility competing ISPs do not have rival-weakening incentives so that network externalities cannot justify market power.
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The same rigorous consistency should be applied throughout the rest of the analysis, e.g. when addressing the issue of recoupment. The European Commission argued that one main entry barrier was the costs of acquiring a critical size in a mass market. The economic concept of "critical mass" refers to the minimum positive network size that can be sustained in equilibrium. This solution is unstable as a small variation in the number of network adopters shifts the market to either of two extreme (stable) equilibria: the first equilibrium where adoption does not occur; or the second one where network externalities are exploited in full. A main consequence of the existence of a positive critical mass (and of multiple equilibria) is that as long as the critical mass is not exceeded, demand synergies develop only to a limited extent. However, under conditions of compatibility among the local network, rival ISPs do not have to achieve a critical mass on their own in order to benefit from network synergies from the demand side, as the relevant critical mass size is that of the overall local network (the Internet). What the European Commission referred to could have been better captured by the economic concept of minimum efficient scale: the minimum network size needed to benefit from scale economies (production synergies from the supply side).
Compatibility among rival ISPs is instead relevant in defining sources and degree of uncertainty regarding broadband adoption. Technology adoption 71 Id. at 314. 72 Compatibility is here to be regarded as being exogenously determined, as the IP/TCP standard is a legacy from the early non-commercial Internet era. See Kende (2000) . 73 Economides and Himmelberg (1995) show that under condition of compatibility the ranking of market structures based on their allocative properties is not affected by network externalities. Network effects cannot justify market power. However, it is important to recognize that the welfare benchmark for the assessment of the consequences of a less competitive market structure is not the first best, as price taking behavior would not guarantee a Pareto optimal allocation of resources in this case.
is governed by individual preferences and aggregate conducts. With large sunk costs, demand uncertainty makes irreversibility of capital investment a powerful entry deterrent. McAfee et al. (2004) described sunk costs and uncertainty as ancillary antitrust entry barriers, as both do not deter entry on their own (non economic barriers to entry), but their combined presence delays entry until the realization of uncertainty. Therefore, the need to commit to a large irreversible capital investment is not sufficient to deter or delay entry, absent demand uncertainty. A common (systemic) source of uncertainty is linked to the consumer uncertainty about the performance characteristics of new sophisticated products. As explained above, this may slow down the overall speed of diffusion because of the "chicken and egg" coordination failure in reference to an old vs. new transition process. Instead, contrary to the case of incompatibility among competing local networks, consumers do not find additional (specific) uncertainty about which competing network product will lead in terms of population coverage. Therefore, they do not face the risk of being stranded on the failing alternative (strategic technical uncertainty).
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This source of uncertainty refers to the so-called "splintering effect", whereby horizontal differentiation among incompatible network products discourages unilateral moves, but is weak enough that a coordinated move of everyone would benefit all (Kretschmer, 2005 and Farrell and Klemperer, 2006) . Contrary to the "chicken and egg" problem, "splintering" is a supply-side source of coordination failure, whereby incompatible network owners compete to sponsor their own platform. Therefore, "splintering" is a coordination failure that complements the old vs. new issue discussed above, with adopters facing not only the decision of whether or not to adopt, but also which standard to adopt. This source of coordination failure would be particularly acute in case there is a unique old standard, so that competition among the new ones might forestall intergenerational transition (Kretschmer, 2005) .
According to the European Commission's denial of Wanadoo's efficiency defence, the absence of strategic technical uncertainty excludes that sunk costs could be a source of asymmetric competitive advantage in favour of the incumbent, which would likely possess and operate the largest local network. Nevertheless, sunk costs might deter entry across the board, due to overall (systemic) demand uncertainty.
In this regard, Economides (1999) argued that "a close examination of the issue of uncertainty in the local telecommunication network reveals that: i) for 74 Koski (1999) studies a panel of PC diffusion rates in eight European countries and finds that diffusion is indeed slower where Apple and IBM/Intel/Microsoft have relatively similar shares. Similarly, Gruber an Verboven (2001) and Koski and Kretschmer (2004) study the diffusion for 1G and 2G mobile telephony, respectively, and find that standardization (i.e. reduction of uncertainty as to the future technological standard) accelerates diffusion.
most unbundled network elements, there is little demand uncertainty; and ii) that those elements that face significant uncertainty, do not have sunk value." On the contrary, Pyndick (2004) made a case for mandatory unbundling of the local loop allowing the entrant to rent facilities in small increments for short duration, with no long-term contracts required and at prices reflecting what it would cost to build a new, efficient, large-scale network (a figure that is usually lower than the historic cost of local network development). These flexible sharing opportunities allow the entrant to avoid the sunk cost, thus leading to an asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not properly accounted for by the pricing of network services. In any case, the presence of both demand uncertainty and sunk costs should be treated in light of the strategic interaction among competitors that have the option to invest in the same market, and the managerial flexibility regarding the timing of investment/entry. 75 The option is commonly exercisable (non exclusivity) and repeatable (non rivalry). Under such circumstances, there can be both a first-mover advantage and a second-mover advantage. If a commitment is credible, pre-emption can award a first-mover advantage to the winner, thereby forcing the other players to act contingent on the first mover's action. 76 On the other hand, the option to defer investment can give an advantage owing to the information spill over that helps followers in resolving uncertainty.
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For our purposes, it is not essential to define what source of competitive advantage outweighs the other; instead, it is sufficient to accept that there is a value in postponing entry, in that demand uncertainty can be solved by observing the first-mover's performance/strategy. As for the relationship between scale economies and brand loyalty, it is important to capture the endogenity in the ex-post degree of contestability due to the strategic scheme pursued by the incumbent. The fulfilment of pre-emption by the incumbent/first-mover helps rival ISPs in resolving (systemic) demand uncertainty. Absent demand uncertainty, sunk costs alone cannot deter entry. Thus, the presence of large sunk costs is not an obstacle to entry on its own supporting the probability of recoupment, which should be the subject matter of the competitive assessment in a case of predation.
In Wanadoo Interactive, when assessing the plausibility of recoupment, the European Commission argued that "the construction of an alternative 75 The real option theory addresses the issue of investment decisions under uncertainty (see, Dixit and Pyndick, 1994; McDonald and Siegel, 1986) . In this literature Nature chooses a state of the world at each point in time that influences the profitability of the investment project. The problem is then to find the optimal threshold level of an underlying variable (e.g. price or output of the firm), above which the investment should be undertaken. For an overview of the interplay of real option and sunk costs in antitrust, see Pyndick (2005) . 76 The equilibrium concept used in pre-emption games was developed by Funderberg and Tirole (1985) . 77 The equilibrium concept used in "war of attrition" games was developed by Hendricks et al. (1988) .
telecommunications network and the recourse to local loop unbundling solution results in considerable delay and the initial tying-up of large sums of money. In these circumstances, this model, which alone makes it possible to break free from the technical and financial constraints, is being implemented only very gradually and, at the time of this Decision, very marginally. [. . .] They must therefore also be interpreted as barriers to entry."
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Once again, from this passage it appears that the European Commission based its assessment on the ex-ante (unaffected/exogenous) market structure and omitted to consider that the assessment of the plausibility of recoupment should be contextualized during the exploitation phase, rather than while the incumbent is pursuing the pre-emption strategy by means of low prices and large volumes. 79 Moreover, the assessment should also encompass the issue of indirect network effects. If the Internet is mainly thought of as a common platform providing rival ISPs with horizontal compatibility, then it is framed as a pure twoway network good wherein direct network externalities are the main value driver to customers, so that a need to achieve a critical mass with respect to the overall subscriber base arises, but there is also scope to exploit indirect network effects.
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To this extent, what counts most is vertical compatibility (hardwaresoftware paradigm), as some broadband audio-visual applications are oneway services through which an upstream content provider broadcasts premium events to Internet subscribers. According to the proprietary (vertical) structure of content performance rights, 81 applications can be classified in: (i ) content-related applications which imply the transition of contentrelated performance rights from content providers to downstream ISPs (e.g. sport events and life performances); (ii )content-related applications where content providers maintain the ownership of audio-visual contents and distribute them through ISPs' platforms (e.g. downloading and streaming of music files).
When the network effect is indirect, consumption benefits do not depend directly on the size of the network (the total number of subscribers) per se.
78 Supra, note 4, at 364. 79 As a matter of fact, retail broadband prices in France have remained comparatively low, while facility-based competition (in particular, LLU) has thrived successfully in the last two years. 80 Direct network effects are caused by demand-side (user) externalities, whereby the utility from consumption increases with the number of agents consuming the same good; indirect network effects are caused by supply side user externalities and arise when the value of a product increases as the number and variety of complementary goods or services increases (See, Katz and Shapiro, 1985; and Economides, 1996) . There is a relation between direct/indirect effects, on the one side, and one-way/two-way networks, on the other side. One-way networks enable the exploitation of indirect network externalities only; two-way networks can sustain both direct and indirect network externalities. 81 This vertical framework does not apply to peer-to-peer downloading systems, which instead are two-way network where direct network effects are present.
When indirect network effects are present, consumers benefit from others adopting compatible hardware (subscription to the same broadcasting ISP), because it allows them to consume a wider variety of software (access to more premium events). It is the number of different software that matters, not the quantity (or price) of a particular one. This entails that within this setting, adoption externalities with indirect network effects are the result of variety effects and not of price effects.
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However, the way inframarginal consumers benefit from indirect effects is identical to the case of direct effects (the ability to create new systems of complementary products). Therefore, network externalities that arise in settings with indirect network effects have the same micro foundations as network externalities that arise in settings with direct network effects. The similarity described above can be clearly appreciated in the case of (vertical) audio-visual applications. Where performance rights are purchased by ISPs, they would arguably trigger their procurement decisions of premium contents with respect to their actual (or expected) subscriber base: the larger their subscriber base, the greater their willingness to pay for premium content performance rights, and the more compelling their offering is to their customers. 83 Instead, where ISPs distribute content only, there would be a case of twosided market whereby indirect network externalities arise between the ISP's subscriber base and proprietary content providers, with the ISP acting as an intermediary platform.
Notwithstanding this similarity, the accent on variety rather than on sheer network size impacts on the definition of critical mass in settings where indirect network effects are present. The threshold that fosters demand synergies is not the number of subscribers connected to the same ISP, but the portfolio of premium events to which subscribers can access (individually). This leads to unintuitive consequences: if network effects are indirect, there may be a critical mass beyond which an additional variant of a (vertical) complementary (accessible) product does not confer any additional value to the network platform.
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For example, it is well known that game console software has a highly skewed sales distribution, with "blockbuster" games accounting for a large chunk of overall sales within a platform.
85 This "blockbuster" feature has significant consequences for market structure: if a large proportion of subscribers wants to access a tiny selection of premium contents only, any delivering platform that can provide a sufficient number of "blockbuster" contents is viable and, thus, unlikely to be crowded out by a platform that offers more complementary (accessible) products.
82 See Church and Gandal (2004) . 83 However, this may be seen as economies of scale a broadcaster obtains from spreading content costs over a larger base of subscribers. 84 See Kosky and Kretschmer (2004) . 85 See Bayus and Shankar (2003) .
How does the analysis above apply to the competitive assessment of predatory abuses in the Internet access market? With reference to the three criteria by Bolton et al. (2001) reviewed above, a plausible efficiency gain from the preemption strategy in the Internet access market could lie in the (actual or expected) achievement of that threshold in the incumbent's subscriber base which triggers the mass development of broadband audio-visual services (through the exploitation of indirect network effects). Under such circumstances, firms may compete hard for early adoptions, notably through a penetration pricing stategy. 86 Moreover, for audio-visual applications where content providers maintain the ownership of performance rights (two-sided markets), the very nature of the economic incentives in place would suggest that the ISP prices below costs in order to bring both sides of the market on board.
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In particular the hardware-software paradigm and the variety feature described above have two important consequences for the adoption process. Firstly, ISPs have to bring on board the consumer side first, i.e. to sell the hardware first. A stylised fact of two-sided platforms delivering content-related applications is that the platform owner has to build up first a critical mass on the consumer side, in order to trigger the supply of content (variety) on its platform. Stated otherwise, since indirect network effects are mainly proprietary, the plurality of platforms means that content providers have to be persuaded to commit to a specific platform by relatively large consumers bases. Secondly, when deciding upon adoption, consumers face uncertainty about the variety and quality of software and about future software prices, i.e. the software is an experience good. Both consequences point to the need for ISPs to penetrate/sponsor their own platform, as demand for hardware (i.e., broadband Internet access) is particularly elastic with respect to price at the beginning of the cycle, and a low introductory hardware price under consumer uncertainty signals the platform provider's confidence on (and commitment to) its success.
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The European Commission argued that a main difference in use that distinguishes broadband from narrowband Internet access refers to contentrelated applications (e.g. streaming and downloading). Moreover, in Wanadoo Interactive it recognized that content-related activities are inseparable from basic broadband access provision. Arguably, the capillary deployment of broadband lines is a necessary prerequisite for content-related services to be (conveniently) mass marketed, thus to foster proprietary broadband local access through penetration pricing may be a rational choice.
86 See Farrell and Klemperer (2005) . 87 See Rochet and Tirole (2003) . 88 These hardware-software demand features are stylised facts of the adoption process of contentrelated two-sided platforms such as video and music formats, game console, PDA and also mobile internet in Japan, e.g. i-mode. For an impressive survey, see Koski and Kretschmer (2004) .
As regard the second criterion, the absence of less restrictive alternatives is due to the need to sufficiently develop a proprietary subscriber base, in order to make premium-content procurement viable.
Lastly, with respect to the efficiency-enhancing recoupment criterion, if the market expanding strategy proves to be successful, it would lead to a deeper penetration of broadband Internet access and an increased customariness among subscribers in the fruition of audio-visual broadband applications. Even in the worst scenario wherein telecom incumbents have monopolized their respective national broadband Internet access service markets, could this imply that they can reasonably foreclose potential competitors by preventing them to earn monopoly profits either in the basic Internet access activities, or in content related activities?
As regards basic Internet access, provided that regulatory unbundling of the local loop is in place (especially in the forms of bitstream access and end-to-end resale), potential competitors will have access to this essential network element in order to let end-users switch away from the incumbent (whenever they decide to do so). This point is intertwined with the regulatory methodology applied by NRAs to define wholesale charges. As far as the wholesale access is concerned, telecommunications regulators have generally relied on two principal methodologies: long run incremental cost (LRIC) and retail-minus. The first methodology would prevent incumbents from excessive pricing abuses, while the second system better fits to price squeeze exclusionary abuses. 89 Thus, when the main anticompetitive concerns is excessive pricing (because the incumbent is trying to recoup its losses), the presence of a retail minus approach should require close scrutiny by NCAs and NRAs. Moreover, as explained in the previous Sections, the fulfilment of the pre-emption scheme would likely impact on the ex-post market structure in such a way that ex-ante entry barriers (switching costs and sunk costs) would be eased.
With respect to content-related services, once broadband has capillary penetrated across national markets, incumbents cannot technically foreclose a rival web-based content distributor (maybe active on a regional or global scale) to deliver its premium content offering over the Internet. Moreover, the diffused awareness among broadband users of the advantages of highspeed usage would make subscribers keener to quality-based features of audio-visual services rather than to an uncritical brand loyalty. Horizontal compatibility due to the IP/TCP common standard implies that control of local access cannot enable incumbents to control end-user access to content.
Certainly this scenario raises other competitive concerns, such as bundle and tying of basic Internet access with content related services. These issues clearly require a closer scrutiny. However, it is admissible that below-cost pricing could unleash a virtuous circle that would lead to a deeper penetration of broadband Internet access across Member States.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the assessment of anticompetitive concerns due to allegedly exclusionary practices by vertically integrated incumbents, the Chicago-school argument and the endless debate about its (general) validity, is always reminding of the trickiness in discerning pro-competitive from anti-competitive practices, especially when dealing with practices of the sort discussed in the previous sections.
Our main conclusion is that this trickiness cannot be avoided, as enforcement rules entail assumptions and corresponding modelling choices that inevitably get competition law enforcers to take a more-or-less unconscious position in the debate thereof. In particular, from the sequence of slightly different technical choices emerging from the discussion so far, it appears that an erratic enforcement pattern has been followed and that this pattern is unsatisfactory insofar as these technicalities are viewed in light of the persistent refusal by the European Commission to openly endorse what we referred to as the consumer harm test.
In the context of exclusionary pricing practices, this test requires to assess the possibility of recoupment by the alleged predator. We argue that ex-post contingencies make this task less obvious than it appears, thus the need of an open debate is even more stringent and a neat division of labour should be put in place between the but-for price-squeeze test and the consumerharm recoupment test. Whenever the alleged predatory scheme brings about changes that ultimately undermine the very same predation story, the Chicago-school argument should be seriously taken into due count. Otherwise, the risk of committing type-I errors (i.e. ruling against practices that, in fact, are competitive) is bound to increase.
Other conclusions are more technical in nature and attain to the specific features of Internet access service markets. First, notwithstanding that Internet access service can be held to be a distinct relevant market, to conduct a competitive assessment it is necessary to enlarge the scope of the analysis so as to properly account for the strong vertical relationships that impact on the diffusion path of Internet access. This requires to address the issue of broadband content application (in particular, digital broadcasting) as one of the main driver of high-speed Internet access penetration. As a result, the analysis will inevitably increase in complexity, but we suggest that dismissing this part would lead to more frequent type I errors when applying competition law to such emerging dynamic contexts. Second, given that the "but for" test provides only for a necessary condition and that the "consumer harm" test is required to provide both a sufficient and necessary condition for predation to occur, the implementation of the price squeeze test should exclusively aim at establishing whether an as-efficient competitor has been unlawfully foreclosed. Therefore, when computing downstream costs, economies of scale enjoyed by the incumbent should be factored in.
Third, if the standard applied in the computation of downstream costs is that of AAC, incumbent' unavoidable costs that refers to self-provision of network elements which are not specific to the provision of local access to the fixed infrastructure should be factored in.
Lastly, with reference to the need to assess the probability of recoupment in weighing up the existence of entry barriers that are likely to facilitate the recoupment of initial loss, it is important to recognize the sources of endogeneity that may cause a radical change in the market structure. A market structure that is deemed to facilitate the strategic scheme for recoupment ex-ante, may well be changed as a result of the same successful strategic scheme in a way that no longer facilitates recoupment ex-post. These dynamic considerations are particularly important where the market concerned is at its early stage of development so that their omission would significantly jeopardize the economic soundness of the competitive assessment.
